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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of an appeal of a summary judgment ruling dismissing Respondent

U.S. Bank Home Mortgage ("U.S. Bank") from a proceeding brought by Appellant homeowners
(the "Skinners") against a general contractor and U.S. Bank.

The Skinners' residence was

destroyed by a fire. U.S. Bank's loan is secured by a first lien Deed of Trust on the residence.
The Complaint alleges that U.S. Bank took control of insurance proceeds paid by the insurance
carrier because of the residence fire, then negligently inspected the home under construction, and
thereafter disbursed the insurance proceeds to the general contractor when the residence was not
as far along as expected, resulting in an overpayment to the general contractor. The general
contractor then walked off the job and did not complete construction of the new residence for the
Skinners. Skinners asserted a negligence claim against U.S. Bank contending that a fiduciary
relationship was created between the parties and that U.S. Bank breached its fiduciary duties.
The District Court dismissed these claims on summary judgment.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On March 28, 2008, Skinners filed the subject lawsuit against Albert D. Peterson and
Babette Peterson, doing business as PCS Company Inc., asserting a claim for breach of contract.
R. Vol. I, p. 22-28. On October 10, 2008, Skinners amended their Complaint to add defendants,

including U.S. Bank.

R. Vol. I, p. 29-37. On March 4, 2009 the Skinners filed a Second

Amended Complaint asserting a claim for negligence against U.S. Bank. R. Vol. I, p. 56-65.
U.S. Bank filed an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on May 5, 2009. R. Vol. I, p. 73-

80.

On February 12, 2010 U.S. Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b). R. Vol. I, p. 102-104. On May 24, 2010, the District Court issued an
Opinion and Order on Defendant U.S. Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Order

granted U.S. Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal. R. Vol. II, p. 196-212.
Skinners filed a Motion to Reconsider on June 1, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 262-265. U.S.
Bank filed a Response to the Motion to Reconsider on June 10, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 266-270. On
July 11, 2011, the District Court orally denied the Skinners' Motion to Reconsider. R. Vol. I, p.
14. A Judgment was entered in favor of U.S. Bank Horne Mortgage on March 5, 2014. R. Vol.
I, p. 325-326. A Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed April 9, 2014. R. Vol. II, p. 327-329.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The undisputed facts pertinent to this Appeal are largely set forth in the Affidavit of
Sarah Johnson-Fodge filed February 12, 2010 (R. Vol. II, p. 338-384) and the Supplemental
Affidavit of Sarah Johnson-Fodge filed March 30, 2010 (R. Vol. II, p. 173-184).
Most unfortunately, on October 23, 2006, a fire destroyed the Skinners' home. The home
was insured through Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.

Sarah Johnson-Fodge is a supervisor

of the insurance department of U.S. Bank and handles administration of insurance proceeds
when a residence financed by U.S. Bank is damaged or destroyed. From January 2007 through
August 2007, Liberty Mutual issued insurance proceeds to U.S. Bank for a total of $426,556.99.
R. Vol. II, p. 339-340.
U.S. Bank's loan to the Skinners is secured by a first lien Deed of Trust. R. Vol. II, p.
340; 345-359. The Deed of Trust requires that the borrower name the lender as an additional
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insured. The Deed of Trust specifically provides:
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier
and Lender. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by
Lender, shall be applied to restoration or repair of the Property, if the restoration
or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During
such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such
insurance proceeds until Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property
to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that
such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for
the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments
as the work is completed. R. Vol. II, p. 350. Borrower shall be responsible for
repairing or restoring the Property only if Lender has released proceeds for such
purposes. R. Vol. II, p. 3 51.
On October 31, 2006, U.S. Bank provided Skinners the procedures utilized in processing
insurance claims. These procedures included use of a licensed and bonded contractor; that onethird of the funds will be released payable to the mortgagor and contractor immediately; and that
a second one-third draw will be released upon notification from the mortgagor that 66% of the
repairs have been completed and an inspection has been performed to verify the status of the
repairs. R. Vol. II, p. 340; 362. The insurance processing procedures also include an owner's
Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs, which was signed by the Skinners on June 5, 2007
and states:
THE CLAIM PROCEEDS IN THE AMOUNT OF $358,280.97 WILL BE USED
FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE PROPERTY. THE UNDERSIGNED
ALSO AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD U.S. BANK HOME
MORTGAGE HARMLESS AGAINST ANY AND ALL CLAIMS WHICH
MAY ARISE AS A RESULT OF FUNDS BEING PAID IN ADVANCE FOR
THE ABOVE WORK OR CLAIM. R. Vol. II, p. 370.
On June 18, 2007, U.S. Bank advanced Skinners the first draw for restoration of the
repairs to the property in the amount of $119,426.99, payable jointly to Skinners and their

3

contractor, PCS, Inc. The transmittal letter from U.S. Bank explained:
The next draw will be released once the repairs are 66% complete. Please contact
our office to request an inspection once your repairs are to this point. The
inspection performed is a visual inspection to confirm the work is complete; it
does not verify that building codes are met. R. Vol. II, p. 372; 3 82.
On September 5, 2007, following request by the Skinners, U.S. Bank issued a second
draw for partial payment for damage to the property in the amount of $22,700.00 payable jointly
to the Skinners and their contractor. R. Vol. II, p. 374; 383.
On September 25, 2007, U.S. Bank had the Skinners' property inspected by Safeguard
Properties, LLC, and independent contractor used by U.S. Bank for the purpose of inspecting its
mortgage collateral, and in this instance, the Skinner residence. The inspection report reflected
that the percentage of completion was 65% complete, that the contractor was present and that the
mortgagor was satisfied with the work to date. R. Vol. II, p. 341 - 342. On October 4, 2007,
U.S. Bank then issued a third draw for partial payment for damage to the property in the amount
of$139,400.62 payable jointly to the Skinners and their contractor. R. Vol II, p 376; 384.
U.S. Bank learned that the Skinners' contractor walked off the job November 1, 2007. R.
Vol. II, p. 342. On November 15, 2007, U.S. Bank received a telephone call from Greg Skinner
requesting that subcontractors that were not paid by the general contractor be paid from the
insurance proceeds and then faxed unpaid invoices to U.S. Bank. U.S. Bank then issued checks
jointly payable to the Skinners and the identified subcontractors. R. Vol. I, p. 173-184.
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ISSUES
I.
Whether or not the District Court was correct in granting summary judgment dismissing
Skinners' claim for negligence/breach of fiduciary duty against U.S. Bank.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court uses the same standard
employed by the trial court when deciding such a motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Reg!. Med. Ctr.,
130 Idaho 323, 327, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Idaho 1997). "[I]f the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw" summary
judgment is proper. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to prove an absence of
genuine issues of material fact. Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902, 905, 935 P.2d 165, 168 (Idaho
1997). In addition, this Court views the facts and inferences in the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Id.
B.

The relationship bchveen U.S. Bank and the Skinners is not a fiduciary relationship

but debtor/creditor.

Plaintiffs assert in Paragraphs XXIII through XXV of the Complaint that U.S. Bank was
negligent in the following ways:
•

Paying insurance money to Petersons for work that was not properly done;
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•

Improperly administered the funds and owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs to not

overpay the contractor.
R. Vol. I, p. 60.
A cause of action for common-law negligence in Idaho has four elements: (1) a duty,
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. Nation v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 144 Idaho 177, 189,
158 P.3d 953, 965 (Idaho 2007). To establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff
must establish that defendants owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty and that the fiduciary duty was
breached. Country Cove Development, Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294
(Idaho 2006).
Generally, the relationship between a borrower and lender is a debtor-creditor
relationship, not a fiduciary relationship. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.,
121 Idaho 266, 277, 824 P.2d 841, 852 (Idaho 1991).

Fiduciary duties may arise between

lenders and borrowers in limited circumstances where there is "an agreement creating a duty, or
if the lender exercises complete control over the disbursement of funds."

Wooden v. First

Security Bank of Idaho, NA. 121 Idaho 98, 100, 822 P.2d 995, 997 (Idaho 1991).

This is

consistent with federal law. As explained in Teaupa v. US. National Bank NA., 836 F.Supp.2d
1083, 1100 (D. Hawai'i 2011):
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Lenders generally owe no fiduciary duties to their borrowers. See, e.g., Nymark
v. Heart Fed Sav. & LoanAss'n, [231 Cal.App.3d 1089] 283 Cal.Rptr. 53, 54 n. 1
(Cal.App.1991) ("The relationship between a lending institution and its borrowerclient is not fiduciary in nature."); Miller v. US. Bank of Wash., [72 Wash.App.
416] 865 P.2d 536, 543 (Wash.App.1994) ("The general rule ... is that a lender is
not a fiduciary of its borrower."); Huntington A1ortg. Co. v. DeBrota, 703 N.E.2d
160, 167 (Ind.App.1998) (" A lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to a borrower
absent some special circumstances."); Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d
1153, 1161 (E.D.Cal.2009) ("Absent 'special circumstances' a loan transaction 'is
at arms-length and there is no fiduciary relationship between the borrower and
lender."') (quoting Oaks Mgmt. Corp. v. Super. Ct., [145 Cal.App.4th 453] 51
Cal.Rptr.3d 561 (Cal.App.2006)); Ellipso, Inc. v. Mann, 541 F.Supp.2d 365, 373
(D.D.C.2008) ("[T]he relationship between a debtor and a creditor is ordinarily a
contractual relationship ... and is not fiduciary in nature.") (citation omitted).
Idaho follows these principles. As the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed in Black Canyon
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900, (Idaho
1991):
First, regarding Black Canyon's claim of "breach of fiduciary duty" against the
bank, Black Canyon cites no Idaho cases which hold that there is a fiduciary duty
between a bank and a customer. Our cases hold to the contrary. Peterson v. Idaho
First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578,585,367 P.2d 284,291 (1961) ("It is generally
stated that the relationship between a bank and its general depositor is that of
debtor and creditor."); see also Travelers lndemn. Co. v. State, 140 Ariz. 194, 680
P.2d 1255 (App.1984); First Bank of Wakeeney v. 1vfoden, 235 Kan. 260, 681 P.2d
11 (1984); Deist v. Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984); Peters v.
Sjoholm, 95 Wash.2d 871, 631 P.2d 937 (1981), appeal dismissed, cert. denied
455 U.S. 914, 102 S.Ct. 1267, 71 L.Ed.2d 455 (1981); Loucks v. Albuquerque
Nat. Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 418 P.2d 191 (1966); Ingram v. Liberty Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 533 P.2d 975 (Okl.1975); Rivera v. Central Bank &
Trust Co., 155 Colo. 383, 395 P.2d 11 (1964). Reference is made by appellant to
Dugan v. First National Bank of Wichita, 227 Kan. 201, 606 P .2d 1009 ( 1980).
Actually, the Dugan case is not inconsistent with our case of Peterson v. Idaho
First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961 ). The Kansas court in
Dugan stated, "We have been unable to locate any case in which a fiduciary
relationship was held to arise solely through a longstanding creditor-debtor
relationship or prior dealings between the customer and the bank." 606 P.2d at
1015. The rule expressed in the above cases holds that the relationship in a lender-
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borrower situation 1s a debtor-creditor relationship, and not a fiduciary
relationship.
i.

Whether U.S. Bank exercised complete control over the rebuilding funds.

Skinners, of necessity, argue that U.S. Bank exercised "complete control over the
rebuilding funds" and therefore established a fiduciary relationship. This is not the case. The
relationship between Skinners and U.S. Bank is that of debtor-creditor based upon the terms of
the Note and Deed of Trust. The applicable Idaho case law discusses "control" in the context of
disbursing construction loan proceeds, which is substantially no different than disbursing
insurance proceeds.

Laight v. Idaho First Nat 'l Bank, 108 Idaho 211, 697 P .2d 1225 (Idaho 1985) is
remarkably similar to the facts of the instant case. In Laight, a subcontractor sued Laights to
foreclose a lien he filed against their new home when the builder failed to pay for the work. The
Laights then brought a cross-claim against Idaho First National Bank ("IFNB") to recover for
breach of a contractual duty to secure lien waivers from various subcontractors prior to
disbursing the loan proceeds. The construction proceeds were disbursed in the form of cashier's
checks made payable jointly to the Laights and the builder, with the Laights' funds disbursed
first. The agreement required that disbursement "occur immediately upon receipt by the BANK
of a written "Report of Expenditure" from either the OvVNER or the BUILDER." The Report of
Expenditure was to include, among other things, receipts of payment and lien waivers from the
subcontractors, laborers and materialmen.

After construction began, IFNB made periodic

disbursements, however failed to first obtain receipts of payment and lien waivers.
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After

construction was completed, an unpaid subcontractor initiated a lien foreclosure action, naming
the Laights and INFB as defendants. Laights cross-claimed against the bank for negligence,
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The gist of the Laights' claim was that the bank
should have obtained lien waivers before making disbursements, and failing that, should be
liable for any liens filed against the property. The bank then moved for summary judgment on
the cross-claim.
In addressing whether the bank breached its duty of care by failing to secure lien waivers
before disbursing the loan proceeds, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
A mortgagee is not generally obligated to protect the interests of the mortgagor
unless the agreement requires him to do so. 59 C.J.S. MORTGAGES 298 (1949).
The mortgagee may be obligated in the absence of an agreement if it exercises
complete control over disbursement of the funds or if the mortgagee is the agent
of the mortgagor. Laight at 214. (emphasis added)
The Court further held that the Laights did control disbursement to a significant degree
because "The funds were periodically disbursed to the Laights (mortgagors), only at their
request, in the form of checks payable jointly to them and to the builder. The agreement made it
clear that the Laights had the duty to ascertain the status of the payments to the subcontractors
before they endorsed the checks representing the loan proceeds. If the subcontractors \Vere not
being paid, the Laights could have simply refused to endorse the checks until they were. The
Laights thus had sufficient control to protect their interest against the possibility that the
subcontractors were not being paid. This degree of control, coupled with the language in the
agreement explicitly relieving IFNB of any duty with regard to liens against the property,
precludes a finding that IFNB owed a duty of due care to the Laights." Laight at 214-215.
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In the instant case, the contract language is contained in the Deed of Trust referenced in
the Statement of Facts. It also noteworthy to observe that Skinners could have elected to pay off
the mortgage debt, and the Deed of Trust would have been reconveyed as provided in the Deed
of Trust. R. Vol. II p. 357. At the time of the August 11, 2014 Deed of Trust, the debt was
$333,700.00, (R. Vol. II, p. 346) and the fire insurance proceeds received were $358,280.97 (R.
Vol. II, p. 370), which was certainly ample to pay the debt in total.
The Deed of Trust expressly gives U.S. Bank the right to hold the insurance proceeds,
and disburse the proceeds in single or more payments when the work is completed to its
satisfaction. Under U.S. Bank's policies and procedures, it notified Skinners that a second draw
would be issued at the Skinner's request when the improvements were 66% complete following a
visual inspection.

Correspondence also notified Skinners that there was no inspection to

determine compliance with code.
There is no dispute that Skinners requested the third draw, nor is there any dispute that
the checks issued by U.S. Bank were jointly payable to the Skinners and PCS Construction, Inc.
As in the Laight case, Skinners could have elected to hold the check if they felt the contractor
had not sufficiently completed the work, or if the work was substandard. Nowhere is there any
agreement that U.S. Bank would ensure that the residence was completed in a manner consistent
with their contract or to applicable code, or that the contractor would be solvent. The Deed of
Trust language as well as U.S. Bank's correspondence to the Skinners makes this clear. The
Skinners themselves had control over how they disbursed the funds to the contractor, and had the
ability to choose not to disburse the funds to the contractor. Given the control of the Skinners
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over the insurance proceeds, there is no fiduciary duty owing by U.S. Bank to Skinners.
Madridv. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Idaho 2000) is also illustrative. In that case,
the Madrids sought construction financing for their home from First Federal.

First Federal

required a construction loan agreement (CLA). Madrids selected their contractor. First Federal
periodically disbursed funds from the loan during construction to pay for materials and
completed labor.

The disbursed checks were made payable to both the Madrids and their

contractor. Four months following completion, four subcontractors filed lien foreclosure on the
Madrids' home. Madrids cross claimed against First Federal for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty. Madrids and First Federal each moved for summary judgment on their claims.
The District Court granted First Federal's motion for summary judgment and denied Madrids.
The Court cited to Laight and held that there was no fiduciary duty owed by First Federal
because the Madrids had cont.rol over disbursement of the loan funds; the disbursals were at their
request, and the checks were issued jointly to the Madrids and their contractor. Madrid at 805.
The same would be true in the instant case because the Skinners had control over disbursement
of the insurance proceeds; the disbursals were at their request, and the checks were issued jointly
to the Skinners and their contractor. For these reasons, the District Court correctly concluded
that U.S. Bank did not owe Skim1ers a fiduciary duty, and therefore could not have been
negligent.
As Skinners correctly acknowledge in their briefing, there is no contract between the
Skinners and U.S. Bank that creates a fiduciary duty.

And, each of the cases cited by the

Skinners are factually distinguishable. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Executive
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Estates, Inc. 174 Ind.App. 674, 369 N.E. 2d 1117 (Ind.App. 2 Dist. 1977) found that Prudential

had a duty to disburse loan proceeds and protect the interest of Executive by securing releases
from those having claims against Executive based upon a contract and prevailing custom and
practice. Id. at 1123. In Falls Lumber Co. v. Herman, 114 Ohio App.262, 181 N.E. 2d 713
(Ohio App. 9 Dist. 1961) the Court found a duty and breach because the lender paid money
directly to the construction company without complying with Ohio mechanics lien law.
Bollinger v. Livingston State Bank and Trust Company, 187 So.2d 784 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1966)

involved a lender inspecting construction for quantity and quality, and disbursing construction
funds directly to the contractor without approval by the owner, apparently contrary to the note
and building contract. Cook v. Citizens Savings & Loan Association, 346 So.2d 370 (Miss.
1977) involved a reverse situation, and the Court held that the lender had a duty to pay the
borrower's loan proceeds to the contractor instead of issuing the loan proceeds to the borrower
without ensuring the borrower would use the proceeds to pay the contractor.

A1.S.Jvf

Corporation v. Kuntson Company, 283 Minn. 527, 167 N.W.2d 66 (Miss. 1969) involved facts

where the construction lender used mortgage proceeds to satisfy unrelated obligations owed to
the lender. None of these cases cited by Skinners involve facts that are similar to those at issue
in this appeal.
Skinners suggest that the language of the Deed of Trust that gives the lender the right to
hold insurance proceeds during construction resulted in "U.S. Bank protecting their interest at
the expense of the Skinners." This is not the case. As described by the Sixth Circuit in Layne v.
Bank One, Kentucky, NA., 395 F.3d 271,281 (6th Cir. 2005):
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[B]anks do not generally have fiduciary relationship with their debtors. This
flows from the nature of the creditor-debtor relationship. As a matter of business,
banks seek to maximize their earnings by charging interest rates or fees as high as
the market will allow. Banks seek as much security for their loans as they can
obtain. In contrast, debtors hope to pay the lowest possible interest rate and fee
charges and give as little security as possible. Without a great deal more, a mere
confidence that a bank will act fairly does not create a fiduciary relationship
obligating the bank to act in the borrower's interest ahead of its own interest. As
one court noted, "it would be absurd to think that [a bank] could never take its
own interests into account, or that [the borrowers'] interest had to be absolutely
paramount at all times and in all situations.
Even if the Skinners could establish that U.S. Bank's inspection was for their benefit,
which it was not, no fiduciary duty would arise. In Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, 506 F.Supp.2d 388,
407 (D.Colo. 2007), the Defendants asserted that the Bank's alleged representations that it
would oversee a project by performing inspections and controlling disbursement of funds
established a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The Court, however disagreed, holding
"Plaintiffs alleged statements that it would inspect and monitor the Project's progress and
control the disbursements are all activities "within in the normal course of business" between a
construction loan borrower and a lending institution and, therefore do not constitute "special
circumstances" establishing a fiduciary or confidential relationship, citing Torke v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 761 F.Supp, 754, 754-58 (D.Colo. 1991).
To the extent that Skinners argue that a trust was created when the insurance proceeds
were issued to U.S. Bank for the benefit of Skinners and thereby establishing a fiduciary
relationship (R. Vol. I, p. 136), this argument would also fail. As held in the Alpine Bank case,
the creation of an express trust requires that the settlor declare an intention to create a trust. The
Court also noted that the loan was not for the sole benefit of the borrower, but was also intended
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to benefit the lender and therefore no trust was intended. Supra at 408.
The record and case law demonstrated that, contrary to Skinners' assertion, U.S. Bank
did not exercise "complete control over the disbursement of funds which creates a fiduciary
duty." As in Laight and Madrid, checks were issued jointly payable to the Skinners and their
contractor PCS. This gave Skinners sufficient control to determine whether or not they endorsed
the proceeds to the contractor. Moreover, even after the contractor walked off the job, the
Skinners were permitted and did request funds for payment to unpaid suppliers and materialmen,
demonstrating that Skinners themselves exercised control in the disbursement of the insurance
proceeds.
ii.

Skinners executed the "Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs" because

they elected to rebuild at the insistence of their insurance company.

The Affidavit of Intention to Complete Repairs is signed by the Skinners and provides:
THE UNDERSIGNED ALSO AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND HOLD U.S.
BANK HOME MORTGAGE HARMLESS AGAINST ANY AND ALL
CLAIMS WHICH MAY ARISE AS A RESULT OF FUNDS BEING PAID IN
ADVANCE FOR THE ABOVE WORK OR CLAIM. R. Vol. II. p. 370.
To put this clause in context, a brief review of facts in the record demonstrates that U.S.
Bank advanced $119,426.99 on June 16, 2007 to the Skinners and PCS Company Inc. before any
construction began on the Skinners' home. Skinners also allege that they paid the contractor a ten
percent down payment of $43,614.61 on June 12, 2006. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Skinners also spent
$40,000 for a Turf Shed (temporary housing) which enhanced U.S. Bank's collateral. R. Vol. II,
p. 380. Skinners specifically allege that the contractor "failed to properly construct the footing
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drains and seal the basement floor.

R. Vol. I, p. 58.

Clearly, the negligent construction

complained of occurred during the time frame where the contractor had been advanced a total of
$163,041.60, before any inspection occurred.
Mr. Skinner recapped the problems in a chronology letter dated August 22, 2008. R. Vol. I,
p. 378-380. Points made by Mr. Skinner include:
•

Insurance company insisted on replacing what we [Skinners] had, although bids to

do so came in $100,000 over the policy amount (evidently we were undersinsured).

In Mid-July 2007 new foundation for the rebuild began.
•

July through October 2007 the contractor whined about needing more money until

we [Skinners] called the bank and got an inspection that approved payment of the second
1/3 draw.
•

In November 2007, Mr. Skinner discovered the maJor water problem in the

downstairs section and found out the contractor had not installed foundation drains nor
had he sealed the walls before backfilling.
•

Liberty Mutual was holding a residual that might cause a fight because Skinner's

didn't "replace" what they lost.
Skinners were aware that U.S. Bank's inspection was a visual inspection only and did not
verify that building codes were met. R. Vol. II, p. 372. The record reflects that indeed the
Skinners were well informed as to contractor and insurance problems before they requested the
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second progress draw and were in a position to put the brakes on the construction if they were
not satisfied with the progress. They did not do so, and U.S. Bank honored their payment
requests.
The Georgia Court of Appeals has held: "Ordinarily, an action for damages by a property
owner against a lender for negligent inspection will not lie, because the lender's inspection is
normally not made for the owner's benefit, but the lender's protection and benefit."

lvfustagueem-Graydon v. Suntrust Bank, 573 S.E. 2d 455, 460, 258 Ga.App. 200, 206
(Ga.App.2002). Here, the "exculpatory clause" as argued by the Skinners is a recognition that
U.S. Bank is paying out money in advance for work that has not been completed, and certainly
not inspected. There is risk associated with that function, and indemnification for that risk is
properly placed on the borrower. Even though a visual inspection was later conducted, the
inspection was for the benefit of U.S. Bank and not the Skinners. The "exculpatory" clause
simply puts the risk of payment for construction in advance of the work squarely and properly on
the Skinners. Moreover, Skinners were aware that they were to contact U.S. Bank to request a
draw where their repairs were 66% complete (R. Vol. II, p 372), and indeed the Skinners
themselves did make such a request. R. Vol. II, p. 379. Skinners had no right to rely on the
inspection that U.S. Bank obtained from Safeguard Properties for its benefit. As a consequence,
the language of the exculpatory clause or the parties' respective bargaining power is not relevant
because the Skinners had no right to rely on the inspection in the first instance.
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C.

U.S. Bank has no duty to sue Safeguard Properties, LLC.
Skinners argue "U.S. Bank has a duty and is obligated to bring suit [against Safeguard],

yet state that "The District Court correctly found there is no case law requiring U.S. Bank to sue
Safeguard." Appellant's Brief p. 18-19. Indeed, Skinners sued Safeguard Properties LLC as set
forth in the Third Amended Complaint filed June 28, 2010. R. Vol. I, p. 9. Safeguard Properties
LLC moved for Summary Judgment of Dismissal on February 10, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 11. The
Court granted Safeguard Properties LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal on July
11, 2011.

R. Vol. I, p. 14.

If Skinners believed that they had a claim against Safeguard

Properties, LLC and Karen Smith, they could have appealed the District Court's dismissal of
Safeguard Properties LLC as a party.
Notably, the only Affidavit of Plaintiffs in the record in opposition to U.S. Bank's
Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal is that of Greg Skinner dated April 8, 2010. R. Vol.
I, p. 193-194. The Skinner Affidavit provides no testimony that the Safeguard Properties LLC's
inspection was for their benefit, or that the Skinner's were unsophisticated or that they relied on
U.S. Bank.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm that the District Court was correct m granting summary
judgment dismissing Skinners claim for negligence against U.S. Bank for breach of fiduciary
duties because under the undisputed facts U.S. Bank did not owe the Skinners any fiduciary
duties.
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